【編譯】李思 石雨宸 朱曈菲 姚寰宇 馮毓婧

【審?！?/strong>王國(guó)欣 李博軒 戴赟

【排版】梁鑫昱

【題目】

China’s Rise and Balance of Power Politics

【作者】

Zhen Han：塔夫茨大學(xué)弗萊徹法律與外交學(xué)院博士后

T V Paul：麥吉爾大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系專業(yè)教授

【摘要】

以美國(guó)為主導(dǎo)的冷戰(zhàn)后國(guó)際體系已被美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的相對(duì)低迷和中國(guó)的同時(shí)崛起所動(dòng)搖。中國(guó)正迅速成為美國(guó)在印太地區(qū)主導(dǎo)地位的有力競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者。值得注意的是，與冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期的國(guó)家行為不同，該地區(qū)各國(guó)之間缺乏以正式軍事同盟形式出現(xiàn)的強(qiáng)均勢(shì)政治。隨著各國(guó)對(duì)彼此戰(zhàn)略回應(yīng)的不斷演變，各國(guó)仍在實(shí)施對(duì)沖策略。我們認(rèn)為，導(dǎo)致強(qiáng)均勢(shì)政治缺乏的關(guān)鍵因素在于，迄今為止，無(wú)論是中國(guó)還是其潛在對(duì)手都沒有感知到生存威脅。兩個(gè)相關(guān)的關(guān)鍵因素在很大程度上排除了生存威脅，因此在地區(qū)內(nèi)很難形成由中國(guó)發(fā)起或與中國(guó)對(duì)抗的均勢(shì)軍事同盟。第一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素是在全球化時(shí)代，中國(guó)與潛在的對(duì)手建立了更深層次的經(jīng)濟(jì)相互依賴關(guān)系，尤其是美國(guó)、日本和印度。第二個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素是中國(guó)的大戰(zhàn)略，特別是和平崛起或和平發(fā)展，以及以基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)為導(dǎo)向的“一帶一路”倡議。這兩種關(guān)鍵因素任何根本性的變化都可能導(dǎo)致關(guān)鍵國(guó)家面臨生存威脅，從而導(dǎo)致形成強(qiáng)均勢(shì)同盟。

The post-Cold War international system, dominated by the United States, has been shaken by the relative downturn of the US economy and the simultaneous rise of China. China is rapidly emerging as a serious contender for America’s dominance of the Indo-Pacific. What is noticeable is the absence of intense balance of power politics in the form of formal military alliances among the states in the region, unlike state behaviour during the Cold War era. Countries are still hedging as their strategic responses towards each other evolve. We argue that the key factor explaining the absence of intense hard balancing is the dearth of existential threat that either China or its potential adversaries feel up till now. The presence of two related critical factors largely precludes existential threats, and thus hard balancing military coalitions formed by or against China. The first is the deepened economic interdependence China has built with the potential balancers, in particular, the United States, Japan, and India, in the globalisation era. The second is the grand strategy of China, in particular, the peaceful rise/development, and infrastructure-oriented Belt and Road Initiative. Any radical changes in these two conditions leading to existential threats by the key states could propel the emergence of hard-balancing coalitions.

【編譯】李思

【審?！?/strong>李博軒

【題目】Ideational Differences, Perception Gaps, and the Emerging Sino-US Rivalry

【作者】

吳澄秋，復(fù)旦大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系與公共事務(wù)學(xué)院副教授，主要從事亞太地區(qū)國(guó)際關(guān)系、政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、中國(guó)政治與外交等領(lǐng)域的研究，同時(shí)擔(dān)任英文學(xué)術(shù)期刊Chinese Political Science Review（《中國(guó)政治學(xué)評(píng)論》）的編輯。

【摘要】

中美雙邊關(guān)系在過去的二十年里已經(jīng)悄然變化，從上世紀(jì)90年代，盡管利益和認(rèn)知不同，但全球主義和多邊主義尚能拉近雙方距離的“同床異夢(mèng)”時(shí)期；到可能出現(xiàn)的兩國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)一步疏離，兩國(guó)政府陷入霸權(quán)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的“不同的床，相同的噩夢(mèng)”局面。本文從溫特建構(gòu)主義和認(rèn)知心理學(xué)的角度，提出了一個(gè)系統(tǒng)的、動(dòng)態(tài)的理論框架，并回顧了中美關(guān)系的演變，解釋了上述變化的發(fā)生及其原因。本文將20世紀(jì)90年代初以來(lái)的中美關(guān)系細(xì)分為五個(gè)時(shí)期，從四個(gè)方面論述了美國(guó)的對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略，從三個(gè)方面闡述了中國(guó)的對(duì)美戰(zhàn)略。本文認(rèn)為，美國(guó)的對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略發(fā)生了巨大變化，而中國(guó)的對(duì)美戰(zhàn)略保持相對(duì)穩(wěn)定。中美關(guān)系從上世紀(jì)90年代初到2010年中期的特點(diǎn)是戰(zhàn)略兼容下的合作,而隨后的戰(zhàn)略不相容引發(fā)了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。本文認(rèn)為，中美兩國(guó)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)源于兩國(guó)本質(zhì)上的理念差異，即中國(guó)的國(guó)家民族主義和美國(guó)的自由主義霸權(quán)，這種認(rèn)知上的差異加劇了雙方的隔閡。簡(jiǎn)而言之，中美之間“不同的夢(mèng)想”導(dǎo)致了“相同的噩夢(mèng)”。

Bilateral relations between China and the United States have evolved over the past two decades from the ‘same bed, different dreams’ of the 1990s when, despite different interests and perceptions, globalisation and multilateralism drew them closer, to the potential ‘different beds, same nightmare’ scenario where their economies draw further apart and their governments are locked in hegemonic rivalry. Drawing on Wendtian constructivism and cognitive psychology, this article proposes a systematic and dynamic theoretical framework and a review of the evolution of Sino–US relations to explain how and why the above changes happened. We subdivide Sino–US relations since the early 1990s into five periods that describe the United States’ China strategy in four aspects and China’s US strategy in three aspects. Our findings are that the United States’ China strategy has changed dramatically while China’s US strategy has remained relatively stable, and that Sino–US relations from the early 1990s to mid-2010 were characterised by cooperation borne of strategic compatibility, whereas those ensuing were characterised by competition due to strategic incompatibility. We argue that rivalry between the two countries stems from their fundamentally different ideas, namely, Chinese statist nationalism and American liberal hegemony, and that gaps in perception have exacerbated the differences. Simply put, their ‘different dreams’ have led to the ‘same nightmare’.

【編譯】石雨宸

【審校】李博軒

【題目】

US Hegemony and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Consensus, Crisis, and Common Sense

【作者】

Rubrick Biegon，肯特大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系講師

【摘要】

本文對(duì)美國(guó)在跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系(TPP)中的作用進(jìn)行了批判性分析。在新葛蘭西主義理論的基礎(chǔ)上，本文將美國(guó)退出TPP的決定視為霸權(quán)危機(jī)的表現(xiàn)。通過對(duì)美國(guó)對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)政策中貿(mào)易協(xié)定的目標(biāo)、戰(zhàn)略與地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)邏輯的考察，本文認(rèn)為TPP的主要目的是擴(kuò)大美國(guó)在國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)中的結(jié)構(gòu)性和共識(shí)性權(quán)力。TPP在一定程度上既是為了啟動(dòng)停滯不前的新自由主義議程，也是為了回應(yīng)中國(guó)在貿(mào)易治理方面日益增長(zhǎng)的影響力。文章認(rèn)為，盡管TPP以《全面與進(jìn)步跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱CPTPP)的形式復(fù)蘇，但美國(guó)精英們無(wú)法執(zhí)行最初協(xié)議的表現(xiàn)表明了霸權(quán)危機(jī)的存在。這種危機(jī)主要是由支持經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的“共識(shí)”的崩潰所造成的。

This article provides a critical analysis of the agency of the United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Building on neo-Gramscian theory, it contextualises the US decision to withdraw from the TPP as an expression of hegemonic crisis. Through an examination of the strategic and geoeconomic logics and objectives of the trade agreement in US foreign economic policy, it maintains that the TPP was intended primarily to expand the structural and consensual power of the United States in the international political economy. Partly an attempt to kick-start a stalled neoliberal agenda, the TPP was also an effort to respond to China’s growing influence in trade governance. The article argues that, despite the revival of the TPP in the form of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the inability of elite networks in the United States to implement the original accord is illustrative of a crisis of hegemony driven largely by the collapse of the ‘common sense’ in favour of economic globalisation.

【編譯】朱曈菲

【審校】王國(guó)欣

【題目】

Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe

【作者】

Igor Rogelja歐洲大學(xué)研究院馬克斯·韋伯學(xué)者，倫敦國(guó)王學(xué)院中國(guó)研究院教師。Konstantinos Tsimonis倫敦國(guó)王學(xué)院中國(guó)研究院講師。

【摘要】

本文揭示了歐洲智庫(kù)對(duì)“中國(guó)威脅”的話語(yǔ)建構(gòu)。從理論而言，智庫(kù)在安全化的過程中扮演著關(guān)鍵角色，尤其是在各種想法與參考成形的初始階段。盡管智庫(kù)并無(wú)決策權(quán)，但是它卻在想法的形成與要求過程中扮演了安全化參與者的角色，為政策制定者闡明安全化的參照系。就歐中關(guān)系而言，作者觀察到智庫(kù)和政策制定者之間正在形成一種新的契合，他們致力于非線性地構(gòu)建“中國(guó)威脅”政策框架。本文回顧了通過歐盟官方政策渠道傳播的主要智庫(kù)報(bào)告，并解構(gòu)了“中國(guó)威脅”言論背后的假設(shè)。從分析上講，作者首先認(rèn)為，他們進(jìn)行安全化嘗試的特點(diǎn)歪曲了對(duì)中國(guó)海外經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的描述，包括那些屬于“一帶一路”倡議的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)。其次，在政治上，這種說(shuō)法產(chǎn)生了一種扭曲的歐洲政治概念，即在歐洲政治中，“多元化就是軟弱，不同意見就是異見”，從而助長(zhǎng)了歐盟的一種觀點(diǎn)，即“負(fù)責(zé)任的”核心國(guó)家必須遏制外圍國(guó)家的“機(jī)會(huì)主義”。其三，作者認(rèn)為，盡管辯稱“歐洲性”是人權(quán)和民主的縮影，但中國(guó)對(duì)外直接投資的安全化依賴于其他有可能破壞這些理想的實(shí)踐。通過識(shí)別安全化努力中存在的問題，作者呼吁就中國(guó)投資和融資對(duì)歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)的挑戰(zhàn)展開基于事實(shí)的多元化辯論。

This article unpacks the discursive construction of a European ‘China Threat’ narrative by European think tanks. We theorise think tanks as crucial actors in the securitising process, especially at the initial stages where ideas and reference frames are formed. Despite having no decision-making authority, think tanks participate as securitising actors in the process of idea formation and bidding, articulating a securitised frame of reference for policy makers. In the case of EU–China relations, we observe an emerging congruence between think tanks and policy makers that engage in a non-linear construction of a ‘China Threat’ policy frame. In this article, we review key think tank reports that are circulated through official EU policy channels and deconstruct the assumptions behind the ‘China Threat’ discourse. We first argue that, analytically, their securitising attempt is characterised by a distorted representation of Chinese economic activities abroad, including those falling under the Belt and Road Initiative. Second, politically, this narrative produces a distorted notion of European politics where pluralism is weakness and disagreement dissent, promoting a view of the EU where ‘responsible’ core countries must contain the periphery’s ‘opportunism’. Third, we contend that despite defending ‘Europeanness’ as the epitome of human rights and democracy, the securitisation of Chinese FDI rests on othering practices that risk undermining those very ideals. By identifying the problematic undertones of this securitising effort, we call for a fact-based and pluralistic debate on the challenges of Chinese investment and financing for European economies and societies.

【編譯】姚寰宇

【審?！?/strong>戴赟

【題目】

Proof of Greatness or Evidence of Modesty? A Comparative Analysis of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

【作者】

Min Ye（葉珉），卡羅萊納海岸大學(xué)政治系教授；Quan Li（李泉），武漢大學(xué)政治與公共管理學(xué)院行政管理系教授。

【摘要】

任何有關(guān)中國(guó)崛起后果的嚴(yán)肅討論，都必須首先對(duì)中國(guó)在國(guó)際體系中的實(shí)際影響和地位進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)而嚴(yán)格的評(píng)估。文章考察了一個(gè)在關(guān)于中國(guó)國(guó)際地位的爭(zhēng)論中被廣泛使用的指標(biāo)。盡管許多現(xiàn)有研究認(rèn)為，中國(guó)積極參與聯(lián)合國(guó)維和行動(dòng)是其大國(guó)地位無(wú)可爭(zhēng)辯的證據(jù)，但也有人認(rèn)為，這顯示中國(guó)只是一個(gè)中等強(qiáng)國(guó)（middle power）。本文認(rèn)為，對(duì)于中國(guó)的政策行為應(yīng)該以一種比較的方式，以及動(dòng)態(tài)的角度來(lái)評(píng)估。通過比較中國(guó)與世界上其他20個(gè)主要國(guó)家的維和行動(dòng)人事部署（personnel contribution）的模式與特點(diǎn)，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)的行為更類似于土耳其、印度和巴西這樣的發(fā)展中“中等強(qiáng)國(guó)”，而不是像聯(lián)合國(guó)安理會(huì)其他常任理事國(guó)或傳統(tǒng)的“西方中等強(qiáng)國(guó)”那樣的“大國(guó)”。

Any serious discussion about the consequences of China’s rise must start with a systematic and rigorous assessment of China’s actual influence and status in the international system. In this article, we examine a widely used indicator in the debate about China’s international status. Although many existing studies see China’s active participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations as incontestable evidence of China’s great power status, others contend that it signifies the status of only a middle power. We posit that China’s policy behaviour should be evaluated in a comparative manner, and from a dynamic perspective. After comparing the patterns and features of China’s personnel contributions with that of 20 other major countries in the world, we find that China’s behaviour is more similar to that of developing ‘middle powers’, such as Turkey, India, and Brazil, as opposed to established ‘great powers’ such as other permanent members of the UN Security Council or traditional ‘western middle powers’.

【編譯】馮毓婧

【審校】戴赟

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