The construction of laytime clauses

裝卸貨時(shí)間條款的合約解釋

1.38 There are a number of general principles that apply to the construction of charterparty clauses, including laytime clauses. These include that: 

all clauses in a charterparty should where possible be read harmoniously; 

where there is a con?ict, additional clauses should take precedence over those in the printed form; 

where there is a con?ict, clauses that appear later in the charter are to rule;  and 

clauses can be construed contra proferentem the party for whose bene?t they have been inserted. 

1.38這有一些適用于解釋租船合同條款的基本原則，其中包括裝卸時(shí)間條款的一些解釋原則。它們是：

在租船合同中的所有條款應(yīng)盡可能協(xié)調(diào)地進(jìn)行解讀；

當(dāng)產(chǎn)生沖突時(shí)，附加條款應(yīng)該優(yōu)先于印就格式條款；

當(dāng)產(chǎn)生沖突時(shí)，在租船合同中后面出現(xiàn)的條款占支配地位；和

條款應(yīng)能夠針對(duì)（或不利于）添加該條款并試圖得利的一方進(jìn)行解釋。

1.39 In addition, the courts have over the years expressed various views as to how the intentions of the parties should be discerned from the words they have used in the charter. 

1.39此外，這些年來(lái)，對(duì)如何從他們?cè)谧獯贤惺褂玫脑~語(yǔ)中分辨出當(dāng)事人的意圖，法院已經(jīng)對(duì)此表達(dá)各種各樣的觀點(diǎn)。

1.40 Thus in Storer v. Manchester CC,  Lord Denning MR said at page 1408: 

In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in a man’s mind. You look at what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is, to all outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a contract by saying “I did not intend to contract” if by his words, he has done so. His intention is to be found only in the outward expression which his [words] convey. If they show a concluded contract, that is enough. 

1.40 因此在Storer v. Manchester CC案，上訴法院院長(zhǎng)（Master of the Rolls上訴庭庭長(zhǎng)，主事法官，掌卷法官，卷宗主任）Denning勛爵在第1408頁(yè)說(shuō)：

在合同中，你不應(yīng)該去探尋一個(gè)人腦海中的真正實(shí)際的意圖。你只需看他說(shuō)了什么和做了什么。當(dāng)合同具有所有外部表象的時(shí)候就形成了合同。一個(gè)人不能脫離合同說(shuō)：‘我不打算訂立合同’，如果根據(jù)他說(shuō)的話，他已經(jīng)這樣做了。他的意圖就只能從他[說(shuō)的話]所傳遞的外部意思表示中得以認(rèn)定。如果他們能夠證明一個(gè)結(jié)論性的合同，這已是足夠了。

1.41 In the same year, in Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd,  where the issue was whether a term of the contract was a condition, as the contract stated, any breach of which would entitle the other party to bring the contract to an end, or something less, Lord Reid, who gave the ?rst speech, said this: 

But we must remember we are seeking to discover intention as disclosed by the contract as a whole. Use of the word “condition” is an indication—even a strong indication—of such an intention but it is by no means conclusive. 

The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they should make that intention abundantly clear. 

1.41同一年，在Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd案中，其中的爭(zhēng)議是，合約條文是否如合同中所載明的那樣是一個(gè)條件條文，任何違反該條文就會(huì)賦予另一方終止合同的權(quán)利，或者不足以終止合同，Reid勛爵，他首先發(fā)言，說(shuō)：

但是，我們必須銘記，我們正在試圖根據(jù)整體上的合同進(jìn)行探索其所呈現(xiàn)的意圖。使用‘條件’這一詞語(yǔ)是該意圖的一個(gè)指示——甚至是強(qiáng)烈的指示——但它絕不是決定性的。

一個(gè)特殊的解釋會(huì)導(dǎo)致一個(gè)非常不合理的結(jié)果，這一事實(shí)必須進(jìn)行相應(yīng)的考慮。越是不合理的結(jié)果，越不可能是當(dāng)事雙方所意愿的，然而，如果當(dāng)事人確實(shí)有這樣的意愿，那么他們就越有必要去極為清楚明確地表達(dá)這一意愿。

1.42 Mention should also be made of a dictum of Lord Diplock in Antaios Compania Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB  (a case well known in shipping circles) where at page 201, Lord Diplock said: 

. . . if a detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of a word in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that ?outs business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense. 

A similar dictum was put forward by Lord Mustill in Torvald Klaveness v. Arni Maritime,  where his lordship said: 

Naturally, no judge will favour an interpretation which produces an obviously absurd result unless the words used drive him to it, since it is unlikely that this is what the parties intended. But where there is no obvious absurdity, and simply assertions by either side that its own interpretation yields the more sensible result, there is room for error. 

In Reardon Smith v. Hansen-Tangen,  Lord Wilberforce explained the relevance of the factual background and the commercial purpose of the contract at pages 624 and 625 of the law report: 

No contracts are made in a vacuum: there is always a setting in which they have to be placed. The nature of what is legitimate to have regard to is usually described as “the surrounding circumstances”, but this phrase is imprecise: it can be illustrated but hardly de?ned. In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the Court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating.... [p. 624] 

It is often said that, in order to be admissible in aid of construction, these extrinsic facts must be within the knowledge of both parties to the contract, but this requirement should not be stated in too narrow a sense. When one speaks of the intention of the parties to the contract, one is speaking objectively—the parties cannot themselves give direct evidence of what their intention was—and what must be ascertained is what is to be taken as the intention which reasonable people would have had if placed in the situation of the parties. [p. 625] 

1.42另外還應(yīng)提到Antaios Compania Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB案(航運(yùn)界非常著名的案件)中Diplock勛爵的名言，在法律報(bào)告第201頁(yè)，Diplock勛爵說(shuō)：

……如果對(duì)在商業(yè)合同中的詞語(yǔ)進(jìn)行詳細(xì)的語(yǔ)義和句法的分析將會(huì)導(dǎo)致違反商業(yè)常識(shí)的結(jié)論，它必須屈服于商業(yè)常識(shí)。

在Torvald Klaveness v. Arni Maritime案，Mustill勛爵提出類似的格言，說(shuō)：

當(dāng)然，沒(méi)有任何一個(gè)法官會(huì)支持一個(gè)會(huì)明顯地產(chǎn)生荒謬結(jié)果的解釋，除非這些詞語(yǔ)強(qiáng)迫他如此，因?yàn)樗豢赡苁请p方當(dāng)事人所預(yù)期的結(jié)果。但，當(dāng)這沒(méi)有明顯的不合理，且任何一方簡(jiǎn)單地?cái)嘌哉J(rèn)為他們自己的解釋會(huì)產(chǎn)生更為合理的結(jié)果時(shí)，這就是錯(cuò)誤的所在。

在Reardon Smith v. Hansen-Tangen案，在法律報(bào)告第624頁(yè)和第625頁(yè)，Wilberforce勛爵對(duì)合同的訂約背景和其商業(yè)目的之間的相關(guān)性做出了解釋：

沒(méi)有合同能夠憑空捏造：這總是要有一個(gè)它們被放置的背景。其所要考慮的合法性通常被描述為‘周圍環(huán)境’，但這個(gè)短語(yǔ)不是很精確的：它可以被進(jìn)行闡述說(shuō)明，卻很難去定義。在商業(yè)合同中，這是絕對(duì)正確的，法院應(yīng)當(dāng)知道合同的商業(yè)目的，相應(yīng)地，這又預(yù)示了該交易發(fā)生形成的知識(shí)，背景，來(lái)龍去脈，對(duì)雙方當(dāng)事人影響的交易市場(chǎng)……[第624頁(yè)]

人們常常說(shuō)，在協(xié)助進(jìn)行解釋時(shí)，為了被接納認(rèn)可，這些外在的事實(shí)必須位于雙方當(dāng)事人對(duì)合同的知識(shí)范圍之內(nèi)，但這一要求并不說(shuō)明要太過(guò)于狹義解釋。當(dāng)一個(gè)人談到合同雙方當(dāng)事人的意圖時(shí)，應(yīng)是客觀地講話——合同當(dāng)事雙方本人不能就他們的意圖提供直接的證據(jù)——和，所必須要確認(rèn)的是，拿什么作為合同當(dāng)事人意愿的證據(jù)，且該意愿必須是一個(gè)合理的人本應(yīng)該能夠具有的，如果把他置于合同雙方當(dāng)事人的環(huán)境之下的話。[第625頁(yè)]